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Abstract:  This paper examines the relationship between sale rates and price shocks in art 
auctions.   Using data on contemporary and impressionist art, we show that while sale rates 
appear to have little relationship to current prices, there exists a strong negative relationship 
of sale rates to unexpected price shocks, which is reminiscent of a Phillips curve.  We  
estimate an empirical model that suggests that the reserve price is set on average at  about 
70% of the low estimate.       3 
 
Sale Rates and Price Movements in Art Auctions 
Orley Ashenfelter and Kathryn Graddy
1 
While much attention has been given to studying price movements in the art market, 
little attention has been given to studying sale rates.
2   Because of the presence of sellers’ 
reserve prices, not all items that are put up for sale are sold.   The variability in sale rates 
provides a quantity signal that plays a large role in public discussions of the current state of 
the art market.  In this regard art markets, where the products on sale display considerable 
heterogeneity, are similar to housing and labor markets, where quantity signals also play an 
important role in discussions of the state of the market.  An understanding of  sale rates, as 
measured by the number of items that actually change hands as a proportion of items that are 
put up for sale, shows how quantity signals are formed even in the purest form of auction 
market transaction. 
Sellers of individual art works usually set a confidential reserve price, and if the 
bidding does not reach this level, the items will go unsold.   An item that has not been sold 
may be put up for sale at a later auction, sold elsewhere, or taken off the market.  We begin 
our study by looking in detail at sale rates, prices and unexpected price movements.  
Unexpected price movements are defined as the average percentage difference between the 
sale price and the pre-sale estimate as produced by auction house experts and published in the 
pre-sale catalogue.  We show that sale rates have shown no discernible trend or consistent 
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2 Studies of price movements in art markets include Baumol (1986), Pesando (1993) 
Goetzmann (1993), Barre, Docclo, and Ginsburgh (1996), and Mei and Moses (2002).  
Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003, 2006) provide a survey.     4 
correlations with current price levels, but that sale rates and unexpected price movements 
have a strong visible relationship, despite the efforts of auctioneers to produce accurate 
estimates.    
The confidential reserve price is commonly thought to be related to an auctioneer’s 
pre-sale estimated price.  Indeed, the convention in art auctions is that the reserve price is set 
at or below the auctioneer’s low estimate.  We use this relationship to interpret our graphical 
relationship between sale rates and unexpected price movements.    Using a data set on 
contemporary art in which we have prices for sold items and high bids for unsold items, we  
estimate the average discount that the reserve is set below the low estimate. Our results 
indicate that the reserve price is set at about 70% of the low estimate, which is consistent with 
what little is known about reserve prices.    
In section I of the paper we describe the auction market and summary statistics on 
sale rates, prices, and unexpected price movements.  In section II we interpret the relationship 
between sale rates and unexpected price movements.  In section III we use sale rates and 
unexpected price changes to estimate the relation between the auctioneer’s observable low 
estimate and the seller’s observable reserve price    
 I.  Sale Rates and Prices in Art Auctions 
Art auctions are ascending price auctions, where the bidding starts out low and the 
auctioneer subsequently calls out higher and higher prices.  When the bidding stops, the item 
is said to be ―knocked down‖ or ―hammered down‖, and the final price is the ―hammer 
price.‖  Not all items that have been put up for sale and ―knocked down‖ have been sold.  
Sellers of individual items typically set confidential reserve prices, and if the bidding does 
not reach this level, the items will go unsold. Auctioneers say that an unsold item has been 
―bought-in.‖   
Prior to the sale, a pre-sale catalogue is published which includes high and low   5 
estimates of the art work to be auctioned.  The auction house does not publish, and indeed is 
very secretive about, the seller’s reserve price for the work of art.  The auction houses 
observe an unwritten rule of setting the secret reserve price at or below the low estimate.
3 
Our first dataset consists of objects sold in auctions of impressionist art at Christie's 
and Sotheby's in London and New York.  For the period 1980 to 1990, the dataset on 
impressionist and modern art auctions was constructed by Orley Ashenfelter and Andrew 
Richardson by looking through public price lists  and auction catalogues from Christie's and 
Sotheby's.  For the period 1990 to July of 2007, the dataset was constructed by Kathryn 
Graddy with the help of Ly Tran and Huong Nguyen by using a combination of Hislop's art 
sales index database and the ARTNET database.   Our dataset includes sales of 58 selected 
impressionist and modern artists that took place at Christie’s and Sotheby’s auction houses in 
London and New York.  The artists in this sample were selected because their art is well 
represented at auction.    
Our second dataset on contemporary art was constructed by Kathryn Graddy and 
includes all sales of contemporary art at Christie’s auction house on King Street in London 
between 1982 and 1994. The data were gathered from the archives of Christie’s auction 
house, and for each item, the observable characteristics were hand-copied from the pre-sale 
catalogues.  For this dataset, we have observations both on the sale price for sold items and 




Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
              Year  Observations  No. of   Price  High Bid  Average  Sale rate 
                                                 
3 For a description of art auctions, please see Ashenfelter (1989), who shows that auctioneer’s pre-sale price 
estimates are highly correlated with the prices of subsequently sold items.   6 
   
Auctions  (sold  (Unsold  Items)  estimate 
 
     
items) 
      Impressionist Art 
          1980-1984  4,585  79  87,275   -  78,475  0.707 
1985-1989  9,403  130  287,285   -  206,160  0.749 
1990-1994  7,583  114  400,202   -  437,829  0.612 
1995-1999  11,976  141  340,141   -  253,927  0.693 
2000-2004  8,443  124  326,189   -  288,791  0.686 
2005-2007  6,647  63  384,117   -  340,459  0.773 
              Contemporary Art 
          1982-1984  698  6  4,210  1,991  3,445  0.745 
1985-1989  1,566  12  25,428  11,520  19,511  0.819 
1990-1994  1,993  17  26,081  30,443  32,638  0.740 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the number of observations, the number of 
auctions,  the average prices for sold items, the high bids for unsold items in the 
contemporary art dataset, the average of the high and low pre-sale estimates,  and  the sale 
rates for 5 year periods.  There are many more impressionist art auctions than contemporary 
art auctions because of the way the data sets were constructed.  The sale rate is largely 
stationary over these five year intervals in both datasets. 
4    The average sale rate over the 
entire 27 year period is 69.8% for impressionist art, while it is 77% for contemporary art for 
the period 1982-1994.  For comparison the impressionist art sale rate is 68.5% over the same 
1982-94 period, suggesting the ―normal‖ sale rate is higher for contemporary than 
impressionist art.     
                                                 
4 Price estimates for impressionist art are missing for 105 out of 651 auctions.  80 of 105 of these missing price 




Figure 1:  Sale Rates and Price Indices 
Figures 1 present’s sale rates and a yearly hedonic price index plotted over time  and 
demonstrates that these sale-rates fluctuate around a stable level, with no consistent 
correlation with an index of prices
5. The correlation of yearly sale rates with the current 
impressionist index is -.24, and the correlation of yearly sale rates with the current 
                                                 
5 The impressionist art index is constructed by regressing log prices on 57 artist dummies, log height, log width, 
and 27 year dummies.  The contemporary art index is constructed by regressing log price on 119   artist 
dummies, log height, log width, 20 medium dummies, log of   years since painting was constructed, whether or 























































































Panel B:  Contemporary Art
Sale Rate
Price Index  8 
contemporary index is .26.  There is a higher correlation of the lagged price indices with sale 
rates:  for impressionist art the correlation is -.60 and for Contemporary Art the correlation is 
-.58.  During the 1989 crash, in both datasets prices and sale rates fell.   The negative 
correlations with the lagged yearly price index suggests that price surprises, or ―price 
shocks,‖ might be driving sale rates.  We have a very good measure of price shocks on an 
item by item basis because of the pre-sale estimates placed on items by experts at the auction 
houses.   
  In Figure 2 below, we plot the buy-in rate (which is calculated as one minus the sale 
rate)  against the price shock, by auction, for both impressionist and contemporary art.  Price 
shocks are calculated as the ratio of the sale price to the average estimate minus one for each 
painting, and then  averaged over each auction. For contemporary art, we separate the 
unexpected shock for sold items from the unexpected shock for unsold items (using the high 
bid price in place of a ―sold‖ price).  As would be expected, the price shock for unsold items 
is consistently negative.    
  The figures below show a strong relationship between buy-in rates and price shocks.  
A regression of the buy-in rate on the price shock for sold items for impressionist art yields  a 
slope coefficient of -0.345  and a standard error of  just 0.029.  A regression of the buy-in rate 
on the price shock for sold items for contemporary art yields a slope coefficient of -.322 with 
a standard error of .050.  The slope of the relationship is steeper for unsold  items  at -.759, 
but with a standard error of .399 it is not significantly different from the slope for sold items.  
  This strong observed correlation between unexpected price shocks and our 
measure of volume –the sale rate—is suggestive of a Phillips curve.   Mortensen (1970) sets 
out an elegant model of reservation price determination in a labor market context and uses it 
to explain the nature of a Phillips Curve.  With art, one can think of the buy-in rate as the 
unemployment rate for paintings.  An unexpected positive price shock raises the sale rate   9 




Figure 2:  Buy-in Rates and Price Shocks 
II.   An Empirical Explanation of the Relationship of Sale Rates to Unexpected Price 
Movements  
  Before the auction, the auction house publishes a range of estimates of the value of 
each item for sale, but does not reveal the reserve price, which by convention is at or below 
the low estimate.  Consistent with the common perception in art auctions, each reserve price, 













































Panel B: Contemporary Art
shock (unsold items)
shock (sold items)  10 
individual reserve factor, θit, where Rit= θitLEit.
6 
  An item is sold when                           ,  Now define the price shock psit for 
that item as  ln ln it it it ps p LE   and let  1 it y   if the item is sold,  0 it y   otherwise. Then, 
it it it ps when y  ln         1   , where it is the reserve factor of the seller of item it.  We model 
the reserve factors for individual sellers as:  
ln ln it it it u                      
where  an ―average‖ reserve factor is for all sellers, 
2 ~ (0, ) it u u IN    is a cluster effect.  We 
allow paintings to be clustered by auction date (t), artist, and jointly artist and auction date.  
) , 0 ( ~
2
   IN it is an individual seller effect. Therefore, 
1        ln it it it it y ps u                  
Thus, we have a random effects probit model (REPM) specification, which we can use to 
estimate the average reserve factor   and the standard deviation  across sellers.  In the 
special case of no auction/artist-specific reserve factor effects (μit=0) we have the standard 
Probit model for which:  













y                         
where  is the standard normal distribution function. 
III.  Estimation 
In column 1 of Table 3 we present the standard probit estimates, and in columns 2-4 
we present the random effects probit model (REPM) estimates. The coefficients are highly 
significant in all models, and the results for both the standard probit and the random-effects 
                                                 
6 Ashenfelter, Graddy, and Stevens (2004) show that under certain assumptions, the seller has an optimal reserve 
price which is a constant proportion of the expected price.  This proportion depends upon a seller's discount 
factor, the expected price growth of art, and the variance of the unexpected price shock.     11 
probit indicate that the reserve price is on average 71% of the low estimate.
7  The estimates of 
the standard deviation across sellers, σ, are also similar in the four models, ranging from  
0.259 to 0.290.    The intra-auction correlation (rho in column 2) equals 0.060 with an 
estimated error of 0.020, the intra-artist correlation (rho in column 3) equals 0.037 with a 
standard error of 0.030, and the intra-auction/artist correlation (rho in column 4) equals 0.231 
with an estimated error of 0.052.  Thus, in column 4, approximately 23% of the variance is 
attributable to the same artist within an auction.   
 
How reasonable are our estimates of   In the contemporary art dataset, out of 3295 
sold items, 1263 items (or 38%) sold at or below the low estimate.  In this sample, the mean 
                                                 







 and the coefficient on the price 





ln Pit/LEit 3.397 (0.107) 3.490 (0.112) 3.452 (0.117) 3.859 (0.172)
1.172 (0.044)
constant 1.145 (0.036) 1.183 (0.057) 1.312 (0.060)
RE:  auction SD 0.253 (0.045)
RE:  artist SD 0.194 (0.082)
RE:  artist & auction SD 0.548 (0.081)
rho 0.060 (0.020) 0.037 (0.030) 0.231 (0.052)
Log Likelihood -1315 -1296 -1314 -1304
reserve factor (θ) 0.713 0.712 0.712
reserve factor SD (σω) 0.286 0.290 0.259
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses.  There are 4257 observations in each regression. 
REPM Probit 




(Artist)  12 
price was 87% of the low estimate.  The high bid for unsold items was on average 72% of the 
low estimate.    In impressionist and modern art, 37% sold at or below the low estimate, and 
the mean price was 90% of the low estimate.  The only evidence we could find on any actual 
reserve prices is contained in a book by Peter Watson that documents the selling of Portrait 
of Dr. Gatchet. For this picture, the secret reserve was $35,000,000, 87.5% of the low 
estimate of $40,000,000.
8  
IV.  Conclusion 
  Unexpected price movements regularly occur in art auctions, and these price shocks 
are highly correlated with art auction sale rates.  The probability an item is sold in an auction 
depends  upon  how  low  the  reserve  price  is  set.    In  data  on  both  contemporary  and 
impressionist  art  auctions,  we  estimate  the  confidential  reserve  price  to  be  set  at 
approximately 70% of the low estimate.  Our results explain why sale rates in art auctions are 
considered  so  significant  to  market  observers:    they  indicate  how  aggregate  prices  are 
evolving. 
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